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share investment risks and returns more equally between sponsor and beneficiaries, and to keep pension
plan costs under control.
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Chapter 11
Understanding and Allocating Investment Risks
in a Hybrid Pension Plan
Peter Albrecht, Joachim Coche, Raimond Maurer, and Ralph Rogalla

First introduced in the USA by the Bank of America in 1985, hybrid types of
pension plans altered the traditional form of pension plan design in the
developed world.1 The term ‘hybrid’ pension plan subsumes plans with
elements of both defined contribution (DC) and defined benefit (DB)
plans. The motivation for hybrid plans is to combine the best characteristics of DB and DC plans while circumventing their major disadvantages.
Most include a DC-type individual account, but also provide minimum
and/or maximum annuity benefits at retirement using a DB-type formula.
Additionally, investment returns credited to the individual accounts may be
subject to return guarantees and/or return caps.2
When setting up and running a pension plan, the costs implied by the
specific plan design, as well as the asset allocation decision for the accumulated funds, are of major importance. In a pure DC plan, plan members
have extensive control over their accounts’ investment strategy (subject to
the investment menu they are offered). This enables participants to shape
their portfolio’s risk/return profile to their individual risk preferences.
The sponsor only promises to make a certain contribution to the account,
so the investment risk is therefore completely borne by the members;
consequently, the plan sponsor tends to be rather indifferent toward the
individual’s investment policy, as it poses no cost implications. By contrast,
in a pure DB plan, the sponsor is obliged to provide adequate funds to
cover the plan liabilities, so he is fully exposed to capital market risk. The
asset allocation decision has direct cost implications for his funding situation. In a hybrid pension plan, both parties have an interest in influencing
the plan’s investment policy. This can result in a conflict of interest, which
is the object of investigation of this chapter. At the same time, we scrutinize
the costs inherent in different DB-type elements.
To do so, we construct several hypothetical hybrid pension plans, make
assumptions about key parameters, and the optimal investment strategy for
particular objective functions. These include cost minimization from the
perspective of plan sponsor versus maximizing risk-adjusted pension benefits from the perspective of plan members. Although the design of the plan
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and the assumed parameters do not exactly match actually particular pension
plans, the models draw on real-world elements. In particular, the formulation presented here draws on prior analysis of the European Central Bank
retirement plan,3 though the model plan developed here is less complex.4
This chapter is organized as follows. First, we discuss the main elements
of the hybrid plan evaluated including the minimum pensions guarantee,
maximum pension limits, and the return guarantee/caps. Next, we focus
on technical aspects of the model and the decision-making process
assumed. Finally, we analyze the optimal investment strategy, both from
the perspective of the plan sponsor as well as plan members.

Designing a Hybrid Pension Plan
The pension arrangement analyzed in this study is taken to be a mandatory
plan whose members do not contribute to any other public or private
pension scheme. It is a noncontributory funded pension plan, consisting
of two types of accounts. First, every plan member owns an individual
account endowed by the plan sponsor with an assumed payment of 17
percent of the members’ annual salary,5 representing the employer’s regular plan contributions. In addition to this, the plan sponsor owns a separate
account, called the contingency reserve, which plays the role of a settlement
account for transfers to or from the individual accounts. The funds in both
the individual accounts as well as the contingency reserve represent total
plan assets. All plan funds must be invested in the same asset allocation,
and the return on this portfolio is credited pro rata to the individual
accounts and the contingency reserve.
In addition to the plan sponsor’s pledge to finance the individual
accounts with regular contributions, the plan design includes a combination
of additional guarantees and/or limits. These are related to the level of
benefits at retirement and/or to the asset return credited to the individual
accounts. Incorporating this element influences plan obligations, and it
may require additional payments from the sponsor (in addition to regular
contributions). These supplementary contributions may be triggered in
two cases. First, when guaranteeing a minimum return on the plan assets,
the plan sponsor must cover shortfalls below the target return by replenishing the individual accounts through supplementary contributions. Second, supplementary contributions may be needed if there are guaranteed
minimum pension benefits. Specifically, we posit that if the market value of
the total plan assets falls below 90 percent of the actuarial present value
of the plan liabilities (i.e. the solvency ratio falls below 0.9), the plan
sponsor must immediately endow the contingency reserve with enough
funds to reestablish a solvency ratio of one.
In this plan, participants cannot withdraw funds during the accumulation phase. Members leaving the plan before retirement (e.g. due to
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workforce turnover) may either leave their funds in the plan, or receive the
balance of their individual account as a lump sum (limited to the actuarial
value of the maximum pension where applicable). At the retirement age of
65, the available funds are converted into a life annuity. This conversion
may be subject to the guaranteed minimum pension benefits and to maximum pension limits, depending on the exact design of the benefit structure, to be discussed subsequently.
Benefit Structure. In what follows, six distinct hybrid pension plan benefit
designs are scrutinized. Every plan is characterized by a unique
combination of the elements mentioned earlier. The reason to compare
these designs is to investigate their differential effects on plan costs and
pension benefit levels, and implications for optimal plan asset allocation.
In Case I, which we term the ‘benchmark’ design, the pension plan
consists of an individual account for every plan member endowed by the
plan sponsor with regular contributions of 17 percent of the current salary.
These funds are invested in the capital markets. Beneficiaries are protected
from return shortfalls by an annual capital guarantee, i.e. a guaranteed
yearly minimum return of 0 percent.6 In case the funds earn less than 0
percent in any given year, the sponsor must make additional contributions.
If the funds accumulated over a plan member’s career are insufficient to
pay for an adequate pension, this plan also will guarantee a minimum level
of pension benefits, corresponding to 2 percent of the career-average salary
per year of service. In addition, this plan limits the maximum level of
benefits to 2 percent of the beneficiaries’ final salary (times years of
service).7 In the event of a member either leaving the plan or retiring,
any funds in the individual account that exceed the actuarial value of the
maximum benefits are transferred to the contingency reserve.
The subsequent Cases II–V are constructed by eliminating certain plan
elements, compared to the benchmark case. Case II excludes the capital
guarantee, and in Case III, the maximum benefits are also removed. Case
IV eliminates the minimum benefit from the benchmark case, while Case V
only includes the annual capital guarantee. Case VI includes the annual
capital guarantee and additionally a return cap of 10 percent per year, but
provides no further benefit elements relating to salary and years of service.
If the asset return on the funds in the individual accounts in any year
exceeds the 10 percent level, the excess return will be credited to the
contingency reserve. Case VII does not include any guarantees or caps
and, therefore, can be interpreted as a pure defined contribution plan.
Table 11-1 summarizes the various plan designs.
The minimum rate of return guarantee increases the complexity of the
pension plan substantially. More specifically, the minimum rate of return
guarantee may introduce an asymmetric link between assets and liabilities.
Suppose the value of a given investment account corresponds to a pension

11 / Understanding and Allocating Investment Risks

207

Table 11.1 Summary of Hybrid Pension Plan Designs

Individual account
Minimum benefits
Maximum benefits
Capital guarantee
Return cap

Case I

Case II

Case III

Case IV

Case V

Case VI

Case VII

H
H
H
H
—

H
H
H
—
—

H
H
—
—
—

H
—
H
H
—

H
—
—
H
—

H
—
—
H
H

H
—
—
—
—

Source: Authors’ compilations.
Notes: Minimum benefits are defined as 2 percent of career-average salary per year of
service; maximum benefits are defined as 2 percent of final salary per year of service;
capital guarantee refers to a guaranteed minimal return of 0 percent per year for the
individual accounts; the return cap limits the annual return credited to the individual
accounts to 10 percent.

payment in-between the minimum and the maximum pension limit. In this
situation, a high asset return in any given year permanently increases the
sponsors’ liabilities for the current and future years. Negative returns in
subsequent years do not decrease the liability as the minimum rate of
return guarantee requires the sponsor to replenish the investment account. Thus the high asset return in the first year had a permanent effect
on the liabilities.8 However, in a situation where the investment account
corresponds to a pension payment either below the minimum pension
guarantee or above the maximum pension limit, asset returns do not
have an immediate effect on the sponsor’s liabilities.
Asset Liability Modeling and the Pension Decision-Making Process. Next
we evaluate the asset–liability model and decision-making process needed
to determine the fund’s asset allocation behavior. To do so, we describe the
key assumptions about how assets and liabilities are projected forward, and
then specify decision rules used either by the plan sponsor or by the
beneficiaries to identify the optimal asset allocation. Regardless of
whether the asset allocation decision is made by the sponsor or by the
beneficiaries, a two-step heuristic method is applied which is often found in
practical decision-making formats. In the first step, the set of meanvariance efficient asset allocations is determined using a standard
Markowitz-type portfolio optimization. In the second step, all portfolios
from the efficient frontier are assessed against a projection of asset and
liabilities over a horizon of thirty years.
To project the return and risk effects of a certain asset allocation over
time, it is necessary to specify the stochastic processes governing asset class
returns, interest rates for maturities of three months (representing money
market investments) and ten years, as well as inflation rates. The
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difference between the nominal ten-year interest rate and the inflation rate
(i.e. the real ten-year interest rate) is used to discount future pension
liabilities. The stochastic dynamics of the (uncertain) market values of
the assets are modeled as geometric Brownian motion, which implies that
the log return of every asset is independent and identically normally
distributed. Long- and short-term interest rates as well as the inflation
rate are modeled using the multidimensional Ornstein/Uhlenbeck process, to cover the empirically observable mean reversion characteristics in
these time series.9
The investment universe comprises the broad asset classes, money market instruments, euro area bonds, worldwide diversified equities, and
emerging market equities. A regime-switching model is used to derive
expected returns for the fixed-income asset classes (i.e. money market
instruments and Eurobonds). This technique allows consistent generation
of yield curve projections contingent on expectations about economic
activity (Bernadell et al. 2005). In the long-term projection of the macroeconomic environment, we rely on the economist intelligence unit (EIU)
as an external provider of forecasts for the Euro area, the US, and Japan.10
Expected returns on equity investments are approximated by add-ons to
the long-term yields on government bonds. In the analysis, the equity risk
premium is fixed at 2.5 percent annually for worldwide diversified equity.
Reflecting higher risk of emerging market investments we assume an
equity risk premium of 4 percent for this asset class. All asset classes are
subject to short selling constraints and, in addition, the investment in
emerging market equity is restricted to a maximum of 5 percent of overall
investments.
The projection of liabilities is based on a discontinuance valuation
method usually applied by plan actuaries; this relies on the assumption
that service of each participant ceases on the respective valuation date. It
assumes that at a given valuation date the individual investment accounts
are translated into a (usually deferred) life annuity with inflation-adjusted
payments, whereby the minimum and maximum pension limits laid out
earlier are applied. The real discount rates used for this exercise are the
real ten-year interest rates determined by the asset model. Discontinuance
valuation is performed for each year over the thirty-year analysis horizon
(Bacinello 2000). The valuation of liabilities requires projecting population dynamics comprising the evolution of the number and composition of
staff, salaries, number of retirees, and dependents. For this purpose a
hypothetical population comprising initially of 1,000 staff members is constructed. The population is evolved forward using an inhomogeneous,
discrete-time Markov chain. Transition probabilities are derived using
assumptions for the company’s recruitment, promotion and turnover patterns, evolution of salaries as a function of consumer price inflation, and
mortality rates.
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Table 11-2 Parameter Assumptions for Asset Returns, Interest Rates, and
Inflation Dynamics
Correlations

Eurobonds
Global equities
EM equities

Mean

Volatility

Eurobonds

Global equities

EM equities

5.1
7.6
9.1

3.7
17.9
27.5

1
0.21
0.1

—
1
0.73

—
—
1

Correlations of innovations

3-m interest
rate
10-y interest rate
Inflation rate
Eurobonds
Global equities
EM equities

u

k

s

3-m interest
rate

10-y interest
rate

Inflation
rate

0.043

0.114

0.012

1

—

—

0.05
0.02
—
—
—

0.075
0.286
—
—
—

0.01
0.011
—
—
—

0.8461
0.7757
0.0683
0.0100
0.0100

1
0.8103
0.1396
0.0000
0.0000

—
1
0.0740
0.0100
0.0100

Source: Authors’ calculations.
Notes: Return expectations are derived using yield curve projections as laid down in
Bernadell et al. (2005) as well as the assumption of equity risk premia of 2.5 and 4% for
global equities and emerging markets (EM) equities. Furthermore, the return dynamics
are assumed to follow a geometric Brownian motion. The three-month and ten-year
interest rates as well as the inflation rate are modeled using the process specified by
dXt ¼ k(u  Xt )dt þ sdWt where Xt is the value of the Ornstein/Uhlenbeck process in t,
kappa (k) is the speed of mean-reversion, theta (u) is the long-run mean, and sigma (s) is
the volatility of changes of the process. dWt is the increment of a standard Wiener process.
The above estimates are made on the basis of monthly data from January 1986 throughout
December 2002 for the JP Morgan European Bond index (Eurobonds), MSCI World ex
EMU index (Global Equities), and MSCI Emerging Markets Free index (EM Equities), as
well as German inflation rates, three-month Euribor and REX ten-year yields.

Comparing the value of liabilities with the projected value of assets at the
respective valuation date allows for the evolution of the plan’s solvency
ratio to be determined and supplementary contributions to be made by the
sponsor and average benefits. Given the complexity of the plan design,
solutions are determined using Monte Carlo simulation over 1,000 simulation runs. In the process, we make a number of specific assumptions about
selection criteria used to determine the plan’s optimal asset allocation. To
this end, two different regimes are introduced. Under the first regime,
arguably the standard for hybrid pension plans, the plan sponsor is solely
responsible for the investment strategy. Correspondingly, the second
regime assumes that decisions are made by the beneficiaries. In both
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cases, investment decisions apply simultaneously to all individual investment accounts and the contingency reserve.
For the sponsor, we assume the objective is to minimize the costs of
running the plan. More specifically the sponsor is modeled as minimizing
the worst-case value of discounted supplementary contributions, where the
worst-case value is defined as the 5 percent quantile of the distribution of
the sum of discounted supplementary contributions over the 30-year
investment horizon. Thus, decision criteria other than costs (such as plan
solvency) are not considered explicitly. Plan funding is accounted for by
the solvency rule, as specified later, according to which the funding ratio
cannot fall short of 90 percent in any single year. More formally, let SCt be
the total amount of supplementary contributions to be made by the plan
sponsor in period t and r the appropriate discount rate, then the objective
function is given by:
"
#
30
X
SCt
min VaR5%
(1)
(1 þ r )t
t¼1
Investment decisions for the plan are made collaboratively for all investment accounts. These decisions may be made in the context of an
investment committee composed of staff representatives. Such a body is
assumed to maximize the expected value of the constant-relative-risk-aversion (CRRA) utility function u(PBF) with risk-aversion parameter g > 0.


PBF 1g
max E[u(PBF )] ¼ max E
(2)
1g
Utility is defined over the pension benefit factor PBF which refers to
pension payments per year service expressed as the percentage of final
salary at time of retirement. Factor PBF comprises all simulation runs and
all plan members retiring over the thirty-year investment horizon.

The Plan Sponsor’s Investment Decision
We next take the perspective of the plan sponsor, to evaluate the interrelation between asset allocation in the individual pension accounts and the
resulting plan costs measured in terms of supplementary contributions by
the plan sponsor. Figure 11-1 depicts the worst-case supplementary contributions for Cases I–IV for different portfolio allocations, and Figure 11-2
for Cases V and VI. Worst-case costs are measured as the 5 percent value at
risk of the supplementary contributions, i.e. the present value of contributions by the plan sponsor exceeding the regular payments of 17 percent of
the salaries. Portfolio allocations are represented by the mean-variance
efficient portfolio returns. Details of the cost-optimal asset allocations,
including the asset weights for cash, Eurobonds, global, and emerging
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market equities appear in Panel 1 of Table 11-3. Panel 2 contains the
distributional characteristics of the discounted supplementary contributions for the cost-optimal asset allocations. Finally, Panel 3 reports the
pension benefits for these allocations in terms of certainty equivalents.11
These certainty equivalents are calculated according to the utility function
stated earlier and for four different parameters of relative risk aversion.
Table 11-3 Optimal Investment Decisions: The Plan Sponsor’s Perspective
Case I

Case II

Panel 1: Cost-optimal asset allocation (%)
Mean return
5.57
5.70
Volatility
4.68
5.23
Cash
0.00
0.00
Eurobonds
84.27
79.16
Global equities
10.73
15.84
Emerging markets
5.00
5.00
equities

Case III
5.76
5.53
0.00
76.61
18.39
5.00

Case IV
5.63
4.94
0.00
81.72
13.28
5.00

Case V
4.55
2.17
71.28
28.04
0.68
0.00

Case VI
5.95
6.53
0.00
68.95
26.05
5.00

Panel 2: Distributional characteristics of DSC with optimal asset allocation (%)
Mean DSC
19.64
18.44
22.14
9.24
13.02
7.00
Std. DSC
13.03
12.89
12.60
9.62
8.01
9.17
5%-VaR DSC
42.49
41.50
43.95
27.01
28.04
25.87
25%-Q DSC
10.27
9.04
12.71
0.00
6.95
0.00
50%-Q DSC
17.56
16.12
19.87
6.70
12.15
2.77
75%-Q DSC
26.92
25.65
29.41
15.17
17.96
11.39
Panel 3: Distributional characteristics of PB with optimal asset allocation (%)
Mean PB
1.875
1.872
2.257
1.793
1.531
Std. PB
0.045
0.050
0.415
0.102
0.205
1.874
1.872
2.223
1.790
1.517
Certainty equivalent
(g ¼ 1)
Certainty equivalent
1.872
1.869
2.121
1.776
1.470
(g ¼ 5)
Certainty equivalent
1.869
1.866
2.040
1.750
1.421
(g ¼ 10)

1.939
0.307
1.915
1.827
1.726

Source: Authors’ calculations.
Notes: Asset weights in percent; DSC (i.e. discounted supplementary contributions):
contributions required on top of fixed regular contributions to fully fund the pension
plan (in percent of expected discounted regular contributions); PB (i.e. pension
benefits): attainable income replacement factor (in percent of final salary per year of
service); Gamma (g): parameter of risk aversion in a constant relative risk aversion
(CRRA-) utility function of the type: u(W ) ¼ W 1g =(1  g); Objective function: Minimize the 5 percent VaR of DSC; Q: quantile; Case I: DC þ minimum benefits þ
maximum benefits þ capital guarantee; Case II: DC þ minimum benefits þ maximum
benefits; Case III: DC þ minimum benefits; Case IV: DC þ maximum benefits þ capital
guarantee; Case V: DC þ capital guarantee; Case VI: DC þ capital guarantee þ 10% cap
on asset return.
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Focusing first on the benchmark, Figure 11-1 shows that the worst-case
plan costs for Case I follow a U-shaped curve. With increasing expected
portfolio returns, the costs first decrease and then rise, resulting in minimum supplementary contributions for an asset allocation with an
expected return of 5.57 percent. This portfolio consists of about 84 percent
bonds and 16 percent equities. The minimum supplementary contributions amount to 43 percent of the expected regular contributions. Hence,
for every discounted Euro the sponsor regularly paid into the plan, additional payments of 43 discounted cents are required to cover the costs of
the plan. The U-shape of the cost curve can be directly related to the
guarantees included in Case I. Investing in portfolios mainly consisting of
cash or bonds will result in assets not being able to generate enough return
to cover the costs of the guaranteed minimum benefits. These costs have to
be borne by the plan sponsor. As the expected return on the portfolio
increases, it becomes more and more likely that the funds will suffice to at
least pay the minimum pension without further contributions by the plan
sponsor. The rise in expected portfolio return is in turn accompanied by an
increase in return volatility, which induces costs resulting from falling short
of the guaranteed minimum annual asset return of 0 percent. From a
certain level of volatility onwards, these newly induced costs overcompensate the cost savings related to the minimum pension benefits and the
overall costs increase again.
Changing the structural design of the plan has some interesting effects.
Eliminating the annual return guarantee for the individual accounts in
Case II cuts the amount of supplementary contributions, especially in the
case of a more risky asset allocation. However, the asset allocation which
minimizes costs is only slightly different compared to Case I (i.e. about 5
percent less bonds and more equities). The worst-case costs only fall from
43 to 42 percent of regular contributions. This results from the fact that for
a low-risk asset allocation the costs from the annual return guarantee are
relatively low.12
In Case III, not only the capital guarantee but also the maximum pension
regulation is eliminated; now the plan is basically DC but the beneficiaries
are protected by a DB minimum pension benefit in the event of adverse
capital market developments. Therefore, the amount of supplementary
contributions increases compared to Case II, as there are no longer funds
in excess of those needed to provide maximum pension benefits which
could be credited to the plan sponsor. Looking at the cost minimizing
asset allocation, the equity exposure is slightly further increased to about
13 percent with overall worst-case supplementary contributions of 44 percent.
Case IV shows a quite different curve. The general U-shape is maintained
showing a minimum of supplementary contributions for a portfolio return
of 5.6 percent, which corresponds to an asset allocation of 82 percent
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bonds and 18 percent equities. While the asset allocation is comparable to
Cases I–III, the level of supplementary contributions with 27 percent of
regular contributions is substantially lower than in the previous cases.
Additionally, the left branch of the cost curve (low-risk portfolios) is nearly
flat while the right branch (more risky portfolios) shows a strong increase.
Economically, this can be explained as follows. As discussed for Case I, the
predominant source of costs, especially when investing in low-risk allocations, is the minimum benefit guarantee. This guarantee is not included in
Case IV, leading to substantially lower costs compared to Case I. Increasing
the expected return and the volatility of the portfolio now has two opposing effects. The higher the (expected) portfolio return, the more often the
plan sponsor will profit from cashing in funds from the individual retirement accounts that exceed the amount necessary to cover the maximum
pension benefits. Contrarily, the higher the return volatility, the more often
supplementary contributions will be triggered due to the annual
capital guarantee. Since the former effect dominates the latter for
less risky portfolios, the overall costs first decrease with increasing

5% - VaR disc. suppl. contributions

100%
Case I

Case II

Case III

Case IV

90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%

7.61%

7.42%

7.23%

7.04%

6.85%

6.65%

6.46%

6.27%

6.08%

5.89%

5.70%

5.50%

5.31%

5.12%

4.93%

4.74%

4.55%

20%

Exp. portfolio return

Figure 11-1. Worst-case plan costs vs. asset allocation.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Notes: Discounted supplementary contributions (DSC) in percent of expected
discounted regular contributions; Case I: DC þ minimum benefits þ maximum
benefits þ capital guarantee; Case II: DC þ minimum benefits þ maximum benefits;
Case III: DC þ minimum benefits; Case IV: DC þ maximum benefits þ capital
guarantee.
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expected portfolio return. For more risky allocations the latter effect dominates the former, which leads to rapidly growing contributions. As the cost
impact of the minimum benefit guarantee is diminishing for increasing
portfolio returns, Cases I and IV hardly differ for highly risky portfolios.
We now turn to the cases with no explicit defined minimum or maximum benefit, depicted in Figure 11-2. Case V shows a plan with unlimited
upside potential but with a shortfall protection resulting from the annual
return guarantee. It is clear that such a plan design results in increasing
supplementary contributions, the higher the equity exposure. Hence, minimizing the costs in terms of supplementary contributions leads to the
minimum volatility portfolio, consisting of 71 percent cash, 28 percent
bonds, and only 1 percent equities. The resulting costs amount to 28
percent of regular contributions.
As in Case V, Case VI offers an annual capital guarantee and therefore
protection against return shortfalls. However, the upside potential is limited due to the 10 percent return cap. This structural change has a significant impact on the shape of the cost curve. While the amount of
supplementary contributions in Cases V and VI is approximately equal
for low-risk asset allocations, the costs in Case VI begins to decrease again

5% - VaR disc. suppl. contributions

100%
90%

+ Case VI

Case V

80%
70%
60%

++
+++
+
+++
40%
++
+
+
++
+++
30% ++++++++++++++++++
++++++++++++++
50%

7.61%

7.42%

7.23%

7.04%

6.85%

6.65%

6.46%

6.27%

6.08%

5.89%

5.70%

5.50%

5.31%

5.12%

4.93%

4.74%

4.55%

20%

Exp. portfolio return

Figure 11-2. Worst-case plan costs vs. asset allocation.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Notes: Discounted supplementary contributions (DSC) in percent of expected
discounted regular contributions; Case V: DC þ capital guarantee; Case VI:
DC þ capital guarantee þ 10% cap on asset return.
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for increasing portfolio return and volatility. For these allocations, the
increasing costs resulting from the capital guarantee are overcompensated
by the profits the plan sponsor can generate through cashing in any returns
that exceed the 10 percent cap. With even more increasing volatility, the
costs of the capital guarantee increase disproportionately, leading to overall growing supplementary contributions. With minimum worst-case costs
of 26 percent resulting from investing in about 69 percent bonds and 21
percent equities, this case proves to be the cheapest of all plan designs
discussed. This holds for the minimum cost asset allocation and especially
for all portfolios with high expected returns and volatilities.
Implications for Plan Beneficiaries. The implications of investing in the
cost-minimizing portfolios for expected pension benefits can now be
derived (see Figure 11-3). Panel 3 of Table 11-3 summarizes expected
pension benefit factors and their standard deviation, expressing the
pension benefits as a percent of final salary per year of service. In order
to relate the whole probability distribution of the pension benefit factors to
the risk aversion of a representative beneficiary, the pension factor
certainty equivalents are calculated for a range of risk-aversion
parameters using the standard CRRA utility function. This allows a direct
evaluation of the cost-optimal asset allocation for the various plan designs,
Cases I–VI, from the perspective of plan members with different levels of
risk aversion. Figure 11-3 depicts the certainty equivalents for all
parameters of risk aversion from one to ten in half steps. Additionally,
numerical results for selected levels of risk aversion (g ¼ 1, 5, and 10) are
presented in Panel 3 of Table 11-3.
The figure shows that Case III results in the highest pension benefit
factors for all levels of risk aversion under scrutiny, with the mean benefit
factor being 2.257 percent (see also Table 11-3, Panel 3). At the same time,
Case V always produces the lowest factors, on average 1.531 percent. This is
an interesting result, as both cases show structural similarities. Cases III and
V both offer downside protection to the beneficiaries, Case III by means of
guaranteed minimum pension benefits, Case V with the annual capital
guarantee for the individual accounts. Neither case limits the upside
potential.
An explanation for this can be found when looking at the different costminimal asset allocations. Optimizing the amount of supplementary
contributions in Case V, the plan sponsor will only invest in cash and
bonds, resulting in the lowest risk exposure with respect to the capital
guarantee. With highly conservative risk and return profile of the assets
simultaneously low pension benefits are expected. Such an asset allocation,
however, is not appropriate in Case III, since its return expectations are
insufficient to cover the costs resulting from the guaranteed minimum
benefits, i.e. 2 percent of the career-average salary per year of service.
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Figure 11-3. Certainty equivalents of pension benefit factors for different plan
designs with sponsor’s optimal asset allocation.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Notes: PB certainty equivalent: certain pension benefit (PB) factor, i.e. retirement
income in percent of final salary per year of service, that has the same utility to the
beneficiary as the random pension benefit factor provided by the pension plan.
Gamma: parameter of risk aversion in a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA-)
utility function of the type: u(W ) ¼ W 1g =(1  g); Case I: DC þ minimum benefits
þ maximum benefits þ capital guarantee; Case II: DC þ minimum benefits þ
maximum benefits; Case III: DC þ minimum benefits; Case IV: DC þ maximum
benefits þ capital guarantee; Case V: DC þ capital guarantee; Case VI: DC þ capital
guarantee þ 10% cap on asset return.

Rather, it is necessary to implement a portfolio strategy that offers higher
mean returns, coming at the cost of higher volatility. This, in turn, leads to
substantially higher supplementary contributions, since the plan sponsor
fully bears the downside volatility while only the beneficiaries profit from
the upside volatility.
Implementing a maximum benefit cap (2 percent of final salary per year
of service) results in considerably reduced volatilities of the pension benefit
factors, i.e. 0.045 percent for Case I, 0.05 percent for Case II, and 0.102
percent for Case IV (see Table 11-3, Panel 3). Consequently, the certainty
equivalents of the pension benefit factors are nearly constant for the various
risk-aversion coefficients reported in Figure 11-3. Among these cases, Case I
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offers the highest pension benefits but is also the most costly design. Case
II only offers slightly lower benefits combined with slightly lower costs.
In general, it can be concluded that hybrid plans that offer the highest
expected pension benefits tend to cause the highest amount of supplementary contributions. Yet there are two exceptions: Case V offers by far
the lowest pension benefits, but even given optimal asset allocation patterns, additional costs are not small. By contrast, Case VI has the lowest
supplementary contribution, and will lead to expected pensions benefits
that exceed all but one other case. The rather high volatility of the pension
benefit factor, however, causes the certainty equivalents to drop below
those of most other cases for higher levels of risk aversion.

Beneficiaries’ Investment Decisions
In this section we assume that the asset allocation decisions are made by the
plan participants, rather than the plan sponsor; here, the plan members’
objective function is to maximize the expected utility of pension benefits by
choosing an appropriate asset allocation. This analysis is undertaken for
Cases I–VI and also for Case VII, a pure defined contribution plan. Our
interest here is to look at the resulting pension benefits for plan members
with different levels of risk aversion, as well as the composition of the
optimal asset allocation. For simplicity, we assume that the asset allocation
decision made by the beneficiaries and their cost impact have no repercussive effects on plan member salaries; neither will rising supplementary
contributions lead to lower salaries/salary increases nor will reductions of
plan costs be passed on to the workers.
As earlier, we represent the plan’s portfolio allocations by the meanvariance efficient portfolio returns; details of the benefit-optimal investment
weights (i.e. the mean and volatility of asset returns, mean and certainty
equivalents of pension benefit factors for plan members as well the resulting
costs in terms of supplementary contributions for the plan sponsor) appear
in Table 11-4. The first Panel contains the results for a representative plan
member with a low coefficient of risk aversion (g ¼ 1), while the other panels
show findings for a medium (g ¼ 5) and a high (g ¼ 10) coefficient. Table
11-5 provides details regarding the investment weights.
The results show that, independent of risk aversion, plan beneficiaries
would opt to invest in the asset allocation that offers the highest or almost
the highest expected return and the highest or almost the highest volatility
in Cases I–V. Table 11-5 indicates that the optimal asset allocation consists
of 100 percent stocks. This is because beneficiaries are protected against
downside volatility of the international equity markets by guaranteed minimum pension benefits and the annual capital guarantee. The value of this
downside protection ceteris paribus increases with the volatility. By analogy
to option pricing theory, the minimum pension benefit and the capital
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Table 11-4 Optimal Investment Decision: The Plan Participants’ Perspective
Case I

Case II Case III Case IV Case V

Panel 1: Low level of risk aversion (g ¼ 1) (%)
Mean return
7.68
7.68
7.68
Volatility
17.27 17.27 17.27
Mean DSC
30.91 24.60 29.80
5%-VaR DSC
87.93 75.71 79.28
Mean PB
1.974 1.915 3.937
Certainty equivalent 1.974 1.914 3.355

Case VI Case VII

7.68
7.68
7.68
17.27
17.27 17.27
26.58 126.85 14.29
84.52 246.62 51.33
1.949
6.890 1.948
1.948
6.014 1.918

7.68
17.27
0.00
0.00
3.793
3.093

Panel 2: Medium level of risk aversion (g ¼ 5)(%)
Mean return
7.68
7.61
7.68
7.68
7.68
5.89
Volatility
17.27 16.83 17.27
17.27
17.27
6.18
Mean DSC
30.91 24.14 29.80
26.58 126.85
7.35
5%-VaR DSC
87.93 74.14 79.28
84.52 246.62 26.06
Mean PB
1.974 1.915 3.937
1.949
6.890 1.937
Certainty equivalent 1.973 1.909 2.449
1.947
4.011 1.827

6.33
8.74
0.00
0.00
2.543
2.007

Panel 3: High level of risk aversion (g ¼ 10) (%)
Mean return
7.68
7.61
7.61
Volatility
17.27 16.83 16.83
Mean DSC
30.91 24.14 29.22
5%-VaR DSC
87.93 74.14 77.68
Mean PB
1.974 1.915 3.847
Certainty equivalent 1.973 1.902 2.160

5.76
5.53
0.00
0.00
2.155
1.760

7.68
7.68
5.76
17.27
17.27
5.53
26.58 126.85
7.98
84.52 246.62 26.31
1.949
6.890 1.930
1.944
2.990 1.729

Source: Authors’ calculations.
Notes: DSC (i.e. discounted supplementary contributions): contributions required on top of
fixed regular contributions to fully fund the pension plan (in percent of expected discounted regular contributions); PB (i.e. pension benefits): attainable income replacement
factor (in percent of final salary per year of service); Gamma (g): parameter of risk aversion
in a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA-) utility function of the type:
u(W ) ¼ W 1g =(1  g); Objective function: maximize the expected utility of pension benefits using a CRRA-utility function defined over the pension benefits in percent of final salary
per year of service; Case I: DC þ minimum benefits þ maximum benefits þ capital guarantee; Case II: DC þ minimum benefits þ maximum benefits; Case III: DC þ minimum
benefits; Case IV: DC þ maximum benefits þ capital guarantee; Case V: DC þ capital
guarantee; Case VI: DC þ capital guarantee þ 10% cap on asset return; Case VII: DC.

guarantee can be interpreted as a call option, for which the value is also
positively related to the volatility of the underlying.
Looking at the level of supplementary contributions associated with
these asset allocations, it would appear that costs for the plan sponsor
would be prohibitively high. This is particularly true for Case V, in which
the members’ individual accounts are protected against negative fluctuations in the capital markets while at the same time offering full participation in positive returns. Here, the certainty equivalents of the pension
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Table 11-5 Optimal Asset Allocations: Participant Perspectives
Case I

Case II

Case III

Case IV

Case V

Case VI

Case VII

0.00
0.00
95.00
5.00

0.00
0.00
95.00
5.00

0.00
0.00
95.00
5.00

0.00
0.00
95.00
5.00

Panel 2: Medium level of risk aversion (g ¼ 5) (%)
Cash
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
Eurobonds
0.00
2.55
0.00
0.00
Global equities 95.00
92.45
95.00
95.00
EM equities
5.00
5.00
5.00
5.00

0.00
0.00
95.00
5.00

0.00
71.50
23.50
5.00

0.00
53.63
41.37
5.00

Panel 3: High level of risk aversion (g ¼ 10) (%)
Cash
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
Eurobonds
0.00
2.55
2.55
0.00
Global equities 95.00
92.45
92.45
95.00
EM equities
5.00
5.00
5.00
5.00

0.00
0.00
95.00
5.00

0.00
76.61
18.39
5.00

0.00
76.61
18.39
5.00

Panel 1: Low level of risk aversion (g ¼ 1) (%)
Cash
0.00
0.00
0.00
Eurobonds
0.00
0.00
0.00
Global equities 95.00
95.00
95.00
EM equities
5.00
5.00
5.00

Source: Authors’ calculations.
Notes: Objective function: maximize the expected utility of pension benefits using a CRRAutility function defined over the pension benefits in percent of final salary per year of
service; Case I: DC þ minimum benefits þ maximum benefits þ capital guarantee; Case II:
DC þ minimum benefits þ maximum benefits; Case III: DC þ minimum benefits; Case IV:
DC þ maximum benefits þ capital guarantee; Case V: DC þ capital guarantee; Case VI: DC
þ capital guarantee þ 10% cap on asset return; Case VII: DC.

benefit factors vary between 6.014 percent for a low-risk aversion (g ¼ 1)
and 2.99 percent for a higher risk aversion (g ¼ 10). These high pension
benefits are associated with worst-case (mean) supplementary contributions of 247 percent (127 percent).
Cases I, II, and IV limit the upside potential available to the beneficiaries
by incorporating the maximum pension benefit restriction. This results in
lower benefits and lower costs compared to Case V, yet plan members still
have the incentive to choose portfolios with very high volatility. Even
though the costs are substantially reduced, they are still intolerably high.
For example in Case IV, i.e. Case V with incorporated maximum benefit
limit, the worst-case (expected) supplementary contributions amount to 85
percent (27 percent), being about three times as high as in case the plan
sponsor chooses the asset allocation.
Case VI produces a different picture: now, the annual capital guarantee
and a 10 percent cap on the maximum annual asset return is credited to
the beneficiaries’ individual accounts. Beneficiaries with a low level of risk
aversion (g ¼ 1) will still invest in the maximum expected return/maximum volatility portfolio, but more risk-averse plan members will choose an

220

Peter Albrecht et al.

asset allocation with substantially reduced exposure to capital market risk.
For a medium (high) level of risk aversion (g ¼ 5 vs. 10), the allocation
to bonds will increase from none (at g ¼ 1), to 72 (79) percent (see Table
11-5). We compare this benefit optimal asset allocation from the members’
perspective (with moderate-to-high risk aversion) to the cost optimal
asset allocation from the sponsor’s perspective in Panel 1 of Table 11-3. It
is interesting that from both perspectives, the optimal investment strategy
is nearly identical—to have high exposure to bonds and low exposure to
equities. This results in quite similar cost implication in terms of supplementary contributions. If the plan sponsor were to set the asset allocation,
the 5 percent Value-at-Risk of supplementary contributions would be 26
percent (Panel 2 of Table 11-3); if the representative member with a
medium- or high-risk aversion selected the optimal asset allocation for
him, this would result in supplementary contributions for the plan sponsor
of 26 percent. Hence, if the benefit structure of the pension plan is
designed according to Case VI, this will lead to ‘harmony’ of the members’
and sponsor’s interests, at least with respect to the asset allocation decision
for a given plan design.
Case VI might seem to be most suitable for a hybrid pension plan, as it
combines acceptable cost consequences for the sponsor and attractive
pension benefit factors for the plan members. Nevertheless, a superior
plan design exists. Case VII is a pure defined contribution plan with no
capital guarantee and no return cap. By construction, this plan causes no
additional costs in term of supplementary contributions for the sponsor.
Additionally, as shown in Table 11-4, a pure DC plan provides higher mean
pension benefits as well as certainty equivalents for all levels of risk aversion.
This result is due to the specification of the floor/cap structure, i.e. a
minimum rate of return of 0 percent per year and a return maximum of
10 percent per year. Setting the cap to an annual return of 12.5 percent and
leaving the floor constant at 0 percent leads to the following results: For
members with a low level of risk aversion (g ¼ 1), the certainty equivalent for
the benefit factor of the hybrid plan is still lower than in the case of a pure
DC plan (2 percent compared to 3 percent). For members with medium to
high levels of risk aversion (g ¼ 5 or 10), the hybrid plan is more attractive
than the pure defined contribution plan.13 Yet when increasing the cap to
12.5 percent, the plan members will again choose the maximum volatility
portfolio (i.e.100 percent equities), independent of their level of risk aversion. Unfortunately this will cause unacceptable costs in terms of supplementary contributions for the plan sponsor.

Conclusions
This chapter evaluates key properties of hypothetical hybrid pension
plans in terms of their cost consequences, by adapting a pure defined
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contribution scheme to include minimum and maximum limits for
pension benefits, as well as minimum guarantees and return caps on
individual investment accounts. We also explore optimal investment strategies from the perspectives of both plan sponsor and beneficiaries. We find
that introducing DB elements substantially increases the overall costs of
running the pension plan and has a major impact on the resulting optimal
portfolios.
The investment strategy chosen and the additional plan costs show
strong interrelationship. If only minimum rate of return guarantees are
included in the plan design, additional costs increase exponentially as a
function of higher expected asset return and volatility. Consequently, plan
sponsors choose the minimum risk portfolio consisting of around 70
percent cash, around 30 percent bonds, and virtually no equities. Enhancing this plan with a cap on returns credited to the individual accounts
leads to a U-shaped cost curve for a broad range of possible
asset allocations. Here, the optimal portfolio consists of about 69 percent
bonds and 31 percent equities, i.e. about 50 percent more equities than for
any other plan design optimized from the sponsor’s perspective. At the
same time, with this design the additional costs are reduced to 26 percent
from 28 percent in the case without the return cap.
For plan designs that guarantee minimum pension benefits, the implied
additional costs (expected and worst-case values) are also U-shaped as a
function of expected investment returns. Therefore, assuming the objective
to minimize the worst-case value of additional costs, the sponsor will opt for
asset allocations which deviate from the minimum risk allocation as well.
These portfolios comprise between 77 and 84 percent bonds and between
16 and 23 percent equities. The additional costs for these plans lie in the
range of 42 and 44 percent of regular contributions, i.e. about 50 percent
above the costs of a plan only guaranteeing a minimum rate of return.
Taking beneficiaries’ perspective, we also evaluate the utility implications
of alternative DB elements and sponsor pension fund asset allocation decisions. To this end, certainty equivalents of pension benefits are calculated
for a range of risk aversion parameters. Generally higher additional costs
imply higher expected pension benefits, but the introduction of caps on
credited asset returns allows cost reductions with only slightly lower certainty equivalents of random pension benefits. We also evaluate optimal
investment choices from the beneficiaries’ perspective, and we find that
almost independent of risk aversion, plan members tend to select maximum
return, maximum risk asset allocations where the plan either guarantees
minimum pension benefits or minimum return guarantees. However, if the
minimum rate of return guarantees are combined with a cap on the maximum return credited to individual accounts, risk-averse members opt for
less risky asset allocations. In this case, the optimal asset allocation includes
about 72 percent in bonds and 28 percent in equities.
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Our results are directly relevant to the moral hazard problem faced by
agencies’ insurance pension plan defaults, including the PBGC in the USA,
and the newly established Pension Protection Fund in the UK (see, e.g.
Coronado and Liang 2006; McCarthy and Neuberger 2006; Warshawsky
et al. 2006). Like the plan sponsor in this chapter, those organizations issue
a put option on the value of the assets invested in the insured pension
plans. They therefore should be interested in rather conservative pension
fund asset allocations mainly concentrated in bonds. If, as for the beneficiaries in this chapter, the price of such an option (i.e. the insurance
premium) is set independently of its value, and if the insured party can
influence the value, there is a chance that the insured party will seek to
boost the probability of exercising the option—by investing in high-risk
assets or by underfunding the pension plan. A possible solution to this
moral hazard problem is to implement funding requirements that take into
account both current level of funding as well as investment risk, as for
example is done for the German Individual Investment Accounts (‘Riester’
accounts; cf. Maurer and Schlag 2004).
The analysis presented in this study can be useful when discussing
possible designs of hybrid pension plans. Some plan designs appear to be
Pareto-inefficient (e.g. minimum and maximum pension benefits in combination with minimum rate of return guarantee) as they are dominated by
others which imply lower additional costs and higher expected utility for
plan members. Furthermore, if plan sponsors and beneficiaries are jointly
responsible for investment decision, caps on investment returns may reduce conflicts of interest as asset allocations will diverge less between the
parties.

Endnotes
1. Pension promises in the USA have traditionally been either of the pure DB or
pure DC type (Schieber 2003). In a DB scheme, the plan sponsor promises to the
plan beneficiaries a final level of pension benefits. This level is usually defined
according to a benefit formula, as a function of salary trajectory and years of
service. Benefits are usually paid as a life annuity rather than as a lump sum. As
Bodie et al. (1988) note, the foremost advantage of a DB plan is that it offers
stable income replacement rates to retired beneficiaries. The major drawbacks of
DB schemes include the lack of benefit portability when leaving the company
and the complex valuation of plan liabilities. Moreover, the plan sponsor is
exposed to substantial investment and longevity risk, which could result in
significant contribution expenses. In a DC scheme, by contrast, the plan sponsor
commits to paying funds into the beneficiaries’ individual accounts according to
a specified formula, e.g. a fixed percentage of annual salary. The most prominent feature of a DC scheme is its inherent flexibility: by construction, it is fully
funded in individual accounts. The value of the pension benefits is simply
determined as the market value of the backing assets. Therefore, the pension
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benefits are easily portable in case of job change. Additionally, the beneficiaries
have control over their funds’ investment strategy and at retirement can usually
take the money as a life annuity, a phased withdrawal plan, a lump sum payment,
or some combination of these. While the employer is only obliged to make
regular contributions, the employee bears the risk of uncertain replacement
rates, especially caused by fluctuations in the capital markets (Bodie and Merton
1992).
An in-depth discussion of the implications of introducing hybrid pension plans
in the USA can—among others—be found in Clark and Schieber (2004), Coronado and Copeland (2004), Johnson and Steuerle (2004), and Mitchell and
Mulvey (2004).
The European Central Bank (ECB) operates a hybrid pension scheme; plan
assets, which exist solely for the purpose of providing benefits for members of
the plan and their dependents, are included in the other assets of the ECB.
Benefits payable, resulting from the ECB’s contributions, have minimum guarantees underpinning the DC benefits.
For example, we do not handle dependent benefits and we assume a simplified
population model.
A contribution rate of 17 percent can be considered as reasonable assumption
given the typical structure of European pension plans. For example, in Germany,
contributions to the state-run pay-as-you-go pension system currently amount to
19.5 percent of salaries. As provisions for dependents’ pensions are neglected in
this study, reducing the contribution rate by 2.5 percent compared to the
German state pension system seems a reasonable assumption.
Alternatively to a focus on absolute return, a minimum fixed rate of return
guarantee could be applied to a relative rate of return. For example, Chile’s
private pension funds were long required to earn an annual real rate of return
that depended on the average annual real rate of return earned by all of Chile’s
private pension funds (Pennacchi 1999). Or the guarantee may be applied to the
account balance at the time of retirement, instead of the assumed annual basis.
As is typical for public employees, the wage path until retirement is nondecreasing and so the guaranteed minimum pension benefits will always be lower than
the maximum pension benefit limit.
This link between assets and liabilities is in contrast to the analogy developed by
Bodie and Davis (2000), who compare a pension plan to an equipment trust such
as those set up by an airline to finance the purchase of airplanes. Here the
equipment serves as specific collateral for the associated debt obligation. The
borrowing firm’s liability is not affected by the value of the collateral. So, for
instance, if the market value of the equipment were to double, this would greatly
increase the security of the promised payments, but it would not increase their
size. As opposed to this scenario, in the scheme developed in this chapter, the
value of the assets may well affect the liabilities as a high return in a given year
may increase the value of the liabilities as outlined above.
A drawback of the Ornstein/Uhlenbeck process is the theoretically positive
probability of negative nominal interest rates, but this is eliminated in the
simulation procedure by cutting off the negative nominal interest rates.
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10. The EIU forecasts are constructed with the aid of an econometric world model,
maintained by the UK-based Oxford Economic Forecasting.
11. The certainty equivalent of a lottery is defined as the fixed payment that
provides the same utility as the random lottery.
12. Analyzing the costs of Individual Account guarantees, Lachance and Mitchell
(2004) argue that guarantee costs tend to be insensitive to the asset allocation
in cases where the exercise of the guarantees is either extremely likely or
extremely unlikely.
13. The certainty equivalents are 2.100 percent compared to 2.007 percent for g ¼ 5,
and 1.913 percent compared to 1.760 percent for g ¼ 10.
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